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Scope of Study and Disclaimer
As medical devices increase in complexity their rate of failure or malfunction is likely to increase
as well. The MD PnP system provides a foundation to not only provide interoperability but also
better manage medical device failures or malfunctions because it allows designing clinical applica-
tions to check the consistency between sensor values and monitor control signals. In addition to
design safety, there is another aspect to medical device safety, which is how to ensure operational
safety of medical devices during the patient care process. The operational safety constraints of
medical devices are context dependent and may change dynamically during patient care process.
The context refers to the information on patient state, status of all medical devices in the system,
clinical procedure, etc.
In this report, we assume medical devices function according to their specification and we focus
on how to ensure the safety of the MD PnP system, which itself depends on the safe operation of
medical devices. How to ensure the safety of the system when medical devices are malfunctioning
is a topic to be addressed in the future.
If medical best practices are systematically implemented, they can have a great impact on
patient safety by reducing medical errors related to training, information overload and the clinical
1
process. MD PnP provides the foundation to develop an Integrated Clinical Environment that
can minimize medical errors.
This report is an attempt to discuss the issues related to the safety of advanced MD PnP-based
medical system.The writers intend to facilitate the safe use of MD PnP systems by proposing a
safety analysis framework to ensure no MD PnP component can be a causal factor for known
potential safety hazards in specified medical procedures. However, there are no guarantees and
the developers and medial device manufacturer must review the recommendations provided in
this report before acting on them.
One goal of the Medical Device “Plug-and-Play” (MD PnP) program is the adoption of med-
ical device interoperability to significantly mitigate preventable medical errors by developing the
technological foundation to design the next generation medical systems. The ”Patient-Centric
Integrated Clinical Environment” (ICE) standard is one such development, which is described in
ASTM 2761-09(2013) [1]. This standard describes the logical elements of an MD PnP system but
does not specify implementation details.
A MD PnP system supports a range of safe medical system configurations, where medical
devices are ”plugged in” as needed, information from different sources are integrated, and medical
actions are coordinated to provide an integrated clinical environment. An ICE typically consists
of an ICE supervisor, an ICE network controller, ICE device interface and etc. The MD PnP
system described in this report follows a similar structure and therefore MD PnP and ICE may
be used interchangeably when describing different components of an integrated medical system.
To facilitate the development of medical device interoperability, the MD PnP program has
developed an open source implementation of the Integrated Clinical Environment and made it
freely available on SourceForge [2]. The platform consists of software device adapters for medical
devices (including anesthesia machines, ventilators, and patient monitors), Object Management
Group (OMG) Data Distribution Service (DDS) for Real-Time systems standard middle-ware, and
demonstration applications. The choice of the MD PnP platform, namely, the computers, OS,
and network, is up to the user. There are no approved platforms by any agency that support plug
and play. This is because plug and play could generate new configurations not considered during
the approval process. Unverified new configurations of platform may or may not work, hence, the
need for assurance of life cycle attributes. Furthermore, all existing commercial platforms include
a disclaimer indicating that these platforms are not designed to be used for safety critical systems
and applications.
This document provides guidelines to assist users to safely use an MD PnP system consisting of
a commercial platform not designed for safety critical applications. The MD PnP system is said
to be safe for an intended medical application, if none of the MD PnP components can become a
causal factor of the known safety hazards when the medical devices are functioning according to
their specifications.
In the next section, we present an overview of the MD PnP system components and the safety
requirements for each component. Before discussing safety analysis, a brief introduction on fault
trees is provided in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the safety analysis procedure used in
this report; two different approaches to ensure open-loop safety1 of the MD PnP system are
introduced in this section. Next, we study the safety of six clinical scenarios including airway



























Figure 1. MD PnP System Overview
laser surgery, laparoscopic cholecystectomy and four clinical scenarios provided by the MD PnP
program (Section 4). The examples are used to illustrate the four steps in our safety analysis
procedure. Finally, after studying the examples, we discuss a generic version of our safety analysis
approach in Section 5.
1 The MD PnP System Overview
1.1 Overall System Architecture
In this section, we first look at the overall architecture of the MD PnP medical system and
the associated safety requirements. As shown in Figure 1, the MD PnP system consists of four
parts: 1) medical device 2) MD PnP device adapter, which allows the medical device to interface
with the MD PnP system 3) MD PnP clinical application and 4) the MD PnP middleware that
supports the communication and interoperability of medical devices 2. In this report, we refer to
the combination of computing platform (OS and microprocessor) and the MD PnP middleware
as the MD PnP platform.
Note that the medical devices do not communicate directly with each other. In an ideal world,
there would be well accepted standards on syntax and semantic for device communication. Cur-
rently legacy devices from different manufacture may provide different communication paradigm.
The MD PnP middleware provides a uniform format to clinical application designers for interact-
ing with medical devices. We assume all the MD PnP devices use the same interface description
language (IDL) [4]. The middleware then translates the uniform format to specific device data
and metadata format. In this way, the complexity of heterogeneous devices will be hidden from
the applications and encapsulated by the MD PnP middleware.
The translation and mapping of setting from medical devices to clinical applications must be
verified to be correct for the intended clinical use. In the following, we shall assume that developers
have done so correctly.
2Interoperability refers to the ability to seamlessly connect individual devices from different vendors into inte-
grated medical systems [3].
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The MD PnP middleware runs on top of commercial computing and communication equipment,
which are not designed for safety critical applications. Hence, we need to consider their failure
modes and the safety impacts on the intended medical applications.
1.2 Safety Requirements
MD PnP systems, using dependable commercial platforms with sufficiently long mean time
to failure, can be used safely, provided that 1) the MD PnP system will only be used as an
advisory system and its output does not directly control any safety critical medical devices 2) the
outputs will only be used to activate non-safety critical devices. Non-safety critical devices refer
to the devices that their operation cannot endanger patient safety, assuming the device functions
according to its specification. A safety-critical device is life-sustaining and can directly affect
patient safety. Dependable platforms with sufficiently long mean time to failure ensure high
availability and improve the system usability.
However, the notion of safety criticality for a medical device can only be considered in the
context of the intended clinical use . Therefore a device may be considered a safety critical
device in one clinical procedure but non-safety critical in another. For example, the x-ray device in
[5] is an example of non-safety critical device; the inability of the device to take an x-ray image does
not endanger the patient, assuming the device functions as specified. On the other hand, if the
x-ray image is used in an emergency surgery to determine the exact surgical site, the x-ray device
may be considered a safety-critical device. Another example is a ventilator connected to a patient
under anesthesia. If a ventilator remains off for too long, brain damage may occur. Therefore,
the ventilator is considered a safety-critical device in this scenario since incorrect setting of this
device can endanger patient safety.
In this report we focus on the MD PnP safety, which is a system property. However, the global
MD PnP safety itself depends on the operational safety of individual devices constituting the
system. Operational safety of medical devices is the union of local operational safety : when the
device is used alone it will not become a causal factor of a safety hazard fault tree, and interaction
safety : the interaction of two or more medical devices will not become a causal factor of a safety
hazard in the fault tree.
As an example let us consider the airway laser surgical scenario. The main devices of the MD
PnP system for this scenario include an oxygen controller and a surgical laser. To ensure local
safety of the oxygen controller the device must not be puased for too long that it causes brain
hypoxia. However, to ensure the safe interaction of the two devices in the context of airway laser
surgery, where the laser is applied to the oxygen pathway, the oxygen controller must be puased
when the laser is activated to prevent fire. Interaction safety may create additional challenges,
which must be addressed when analyzing the safety of MD PnP systems.
In the next section, we discuss the requirements for the four main elements of the MD PnP
systems, when the system output is used to directly control safety critical devices.
1.2.1 Medical Device Requirements
There are two categories of safety requirements regarding medical devices. One category focuses
on design safety and the other involves operational safety.
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Medical Device Design Safety: The concept of safety in medical device design has been
broadened from the simple, basic safety considerations to include essential performance
matters [6]. As noted by the recent editions of IEC 60601-1 3, safety standard for medical electrical
equipment, many of medical devices are life-sustaining or critical for correct diagnosis. A device
which does not perform properly can present an unacceptable risk, and hence endanger patient
safety. For example, a defibrillator that will not discharge may be considered unsafe. Similarly,
incorrect diagnosis resulting from a monitoring device malfunction can lead to unsafe or ineffective
treatment.
According to this standard, ”basic safety provides protection against direct physical hazards
when medical electrical equipment is used under normal or other reasonably foreseeable condi-
tions, (e.g. mechanical strength, leakage current and fire safety)” while, ”essential performance
requirements limit or establish critical parameters such as the frequency response of a diagnostic
electrocardiograph and the output energy of a cardiac defibrillator”, which presents an unreason-
able risk should this performance fail.
Within the scope of this study we assume medical devices function as specified and satisfy their
safety and essential performance requirements. To ensure safety of the MD PnP system when
medical devices are malfunctioning is a topic to be addressed in the future.
Medical Device Operational Safety: In addition to design safety, there is another aspect
to medical device safety, which is how to ensure operational safety of medical devices during the
patient care process. The operational safety constraints of medical devices are context dependent
and may change dynamically during the patient care process. The context refers to the information
on the patient state, status of all medical devices in the system, clinical procedure, etc. As
explained in Section 1.2, operational safety of medical devices is the union of local operational
safety and device interaction safety. In this report, we focus on operational safety of medical
devices when analyzing the global safety of the MD PnP systems.
Although we assume that the medical device design is safe and it satisfies the basic safety and
essential performance requirements, for a device to be operating as part of the MD PnP system,
it must also meet the following requirements:
 The device must provide the capability to be controlled and monitored.
 The device must be equipped with local display that shows the current device operational
status such as ventilation mode, infusion rate, medication dosage, etc. The device must also
display what component is controlling the device (ex: MD PnP through remote configuration
panel, or human operator through local control buttons). In other words, the locus of control
must be clear. The local display is specifically critical for manual execution of fail-safe steps
for each device. In addition, explicit notice for overwrite by human operator must be put
on the device local display.
3The IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) is a worldwide organization for standardization com-
prising all national electrotechnical committees. IEC 60601-1 is the parent safety standard for medical electrical
equipment.
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1.2.2 MD PnP Device Adapter Requirements
As described in the ICE standard, a legacy medical device must be equipped with an adapter
to allow the device to interface with the MD PnP middleware, so that the device can be un-
der supervisory control. The existing medical/ health device communication standards, such as
ISO/IEEE 11073 [7], although necessary, are not sufficient for designing medical device interfaces
when developing ICE applications to control and coordinate devices.
We assume a crash failure semantic for this component, i.e. it can only fail by crashing. The
correctness of MD PnP device adapter must be verified to ensure that control or monitoring
values communicating through the adapter would not be altered. We discuss the case, in which
the adapter crashes, in later sections.
Since medical device adapters play a critical role in safe use of MD PnP systems, we are re-
quired to discuss the dependability or reliability of this component, which describes its ability
to function as specified under stated conditions for a specified period of time. The device adapter
reliability affects the open-loop safe solution that can be used for the MD PnP system. We discuss
the details of open-loop safety in Section 3. We consider two classes of reliability for the device
adapters:
Highly Reliable: the device adapter must satisfy an appropriate meantime to failure (MTTF)
requirement to ensure safety of an intended medical application:
 MTTF ≥ NHighly Reliable ×Operation Window
where Operation Window denotes the maximum operation time for the intended clinical use
and NHighly Reliable represents the dependability requirement, which can also be adjusted for
each clinical procedure. For example, under the commonly used exponential reliability model4,
NHighly Reliable = 1, 000, 000 implies one failure per million operations on average. This number
should be sufficiently high for the intended medical procedure, so that the benefit significantly
outweighs the risk. Our design for qualified safety critical components assumes that their proba-
bility of failure during the window of operation is virtually zero.
Reliable: the device adapter must satisfy the following meantime to failure (MTTF) requirement:
 NReliablel ×Operation Window ≤MTTF < NHighly Reliable ×Operation Window
where a lower number, perhaps, NReliable = 10, 000, is acceptable. In medical domain, the system
reliability requirements depend on the intended clinical use. This is unlike the avionic domain, in
which fixed reliability values are often recommended by FAA.
1.2.3 MD PnP Platform Requirements
We call the combination of a computational platform and the MD PnP middleware the MD PnP
platform. We consider the following requirements:
4R(t) ∼ Exp( −1MTTF/Operation Window )
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Data Transformation Correctness: MD PnP middleware logic must be verified. For ex-
ample, the syntax and semantic translation and mapping of settings of devices from different
vendors must be verified to be clinically correct before usage. In the following, we shall assume
that designers have done so correctly.
Data Integrity: This requirement ensures that the data and supervisory commands going
through the MD PnP platform, before being delivered to medical devices, would not be corrupted
in a way that cannot be detected.
It is the MD PnP system developer’s responsibility to validate these requirements. However,
commercial computational platforms and networks are not designed for safety critical applications.
Hence, we assume that they may crash at any instant. We will use the crash failure semantic
for the MD PnP platform in the safety analysis in the rest of this report.
It is quite common that commercial platform vendors issue software or firmware upgrades;
designers should not install upgrades without re-verifying the failure mode assumptions. For
example, upgrades can create backward compatibility issues and unintended bugs not considered
in the initially assumed failure modes for platform or MD PnP software. In cases the upgrades are
applied and the assumptions on failure semantic do not hold anymore, the safety analysis must
be re-examined.
1.2.4 MD PnP Application Requirements
When the MD PnP system in used to directly control safety critical medical devices, it will be
the developer’s responsibility to ensure that the failure of the MD PnP system cannot be a causal
factor of safety hazards. We consider the following safety requirements:
Computational Correctness: For each MD PnP clinical application, the specification must
be validated and the implementation correctness must be verified. For example, if the application
implements a safety interlock or computes closed loop control values, the specification of the
intended capabilities, fundamental use and desired outputs must be validated and the correctness
of safety interlock or control logic implementation must be verified.
Data Integrity: This requirement ensures that the MD PnP application does not perform
unspecified transformation or change measurements and status information received from medical
devices in a way that cannot be detected.
In rest of this report we will assume that developers have correctly verified these requirements.
However, the MD PnP platform and/or network may crash and cause the MD PnP application
to crash as well. Assuming that the computational correctness and data integrity requirements
have been verified by the developers, we only consider crash failure semantic for this MD PnP
component.
Finally, an error-free safety analysis is seldom an easy task. The MD PnP program cannot
be responsible for the correctness of safety analysis performed by designers. In the next section,
we present the general safety analysis procedure followed in this report. Before explaining the











Table 1. Common Symbols in Extended Fault Tree






If a certain event happens while the system is in a given




















The output event occurs immediately after the last of its
input events has occurred, provided that all other input






















OR! This gate has generalization semantic: The output state







Upon is a converting gate; it models the passage from an
event to a state, which has the meaning of referring to
the state after the event has happened for the first time.







On Entering is a converting gate; it models the passage
from a state to an event, which has the meaning of refer-
ring to the point in time where the state is entered. The
input is a state and output is an event.
Table 2. Gates Commonly Used in Extended Fault Tree
2 Introduction to Fault Tree Analysis
To make this report self-contained, we review the main components of a fault tree in this section.






Component Satisfies Safety-Critical Requirements
Non-Causal Directed Edge
Table 3. Symbols for Newly-Introduced Extended Fault Tree Components
compromise the system-wide safety. We also use Fault Tree analysis to demonstrate the behavior
of the system, which leads to the hazardous and unsafe situations. Safety cannot be modeled by
fault trees, which are simply representations of causal chains. Therefore, we use extended fault
tree (EFT), which is the combination of classic fault trees and state/event semantics [8].
2.1 Extended Fault Tree Analysis
The main goal in extended fault tree analysis is adding the capability of expressing state de-
pendencies or temporal order of events. This is necessary to describe a system’s behavior and
analyze its reliability and safety-related issues. In the extended fault tree, there are two type of
nodes, state node and event node. Table 1 shows the common symbols of an event and a node of
the fault tree representation. States describe conditions that last over a period of time whereas
events are sudden phenomena, including state transitions. In EFT, round rectangles represent
states and solid bars denote events. Directed edges with bold arrowheads mark the causal edges.
Table 1.2.4 depicts the gates and notations used in fault tree analysis in this report. More details
about extended fault tree can be found in [9], [10], and [8].
2.2 Context-Aware Extended Fault Tree Analysis
We introduce two additional elements to extended fault tree to provide more contextual infor-
mation. The first one is the Highly Reliable Component. This elements represent a component
in the system that meets the reliability requirement as described in Section 1.2.2: its meantime
to failure must be much longer than the operational window so that the probability of failure is
deemed to be sufficiently low for the intended clinical use. The next element is a Non-Causal
Directed Edge, which represent the cases in which system component may crash but its failure
is not a causal factor of safety hazard. Including such components in fault tree analysis provides
additional information on system behavior. Without the new elements, absence of faulty states
or events of a component in tree can mean either it does not contribute to safety hazard, or the
designer has missed considering the component in safety analysis. Including highly reliable com-
ponents and/or non-causal edges in the tree can provide more details on the system design and
the approaches taken by the designer to trim the tree or break the paths to tree root. Introducing
these elements also helps with evaluating the comprehensiveness of fault tree. Table 3 presents

















Figure 2. Fault Sub-Tree for MD PnP Supervisory Loop Crash
3 Safety Analysis of the MD PnP Systems
In this document, we illustrate how to determine whether the planned MD PnP system usage
is a causal factor in the known safety hazards of a medical scenario. Should the MD PnP usage
be a causal factor of safety hazards, we provide guidelines to transform the configuration so that
it is no longer a causal factor. To ensure safe use of the MD PnP system, we follow a 4-step safety
analysis procedure:
 S1: Enumerate the safety hazards of the medical scenario and draw the extended fault trees
for each hazard.
 S2: Identify whether any MD PnP component is a causal factor of the hazards.
 S3: Recommend a fail-safe solution if any MD PnP component is a causal factor of those
hazards. (without a fail-safe solution users may choose not to use the MD PnP system if
the risks are not outweighed by the benefits)
 S4: Redraw the extended fault tree for any possible fail-safe solution to ensure that the MD
PnP platform/network failure path to the root is removed.
The first and fourth step involve drawing fault trees for enumerated safety hazards of each
clinical scenario. In some cases, the trees can get complex, which makes them less readable. To
prevent this problem, we take a modular approach, in which we introduce sub-trees that can be
re-used in several fault tree analyses. When drawing the trees for different clinical scenarios we
only show the root of subtrees used and their number in a green bubble for the readers to refer
back for more details. The first subtree we present is shown in Figure 2 which represents the series
of events leading to the MD PnP supervisory loop crash. In the third step of safety analysis, we
provide guidelines and open-loop safe solutions to transform the system configuration so that no
MD PnP component is a causal factor.
Open Loop Safety : During normal operation, medical devices are monitored and coordinated

































Figure 3. Automated Open-Loop Safe MD PnP System Overview
control loop is said to be open. By open loop safety, we mean that even if the supervisory loop
opens, the MD PnP system still cannot be a causal factor of a safety hazard. Note that there are
long-term and near-term open-loop safe solutions:
 The long-term solution requires device makers to support simple timed safety actions. Oth-
erwise, the MD PnP device adapter must provide such capability. In this case, the device
adapter must be highly reliable, for the open-loop safety solution to work. We call this
approach Automated Open-Loop Safety (see Section 3.1).
 The near-term solution for existing medical devices is to use a component which includes a
recording device and a watchdog timer to remind users to perform the timed safety actions.
In this case the medical device adapters must only be reliable ; however this added compo-
nent must be highly reliable. The device adapter cannot be trusted to move the medical
device into a safe state when the supervisory loop fails. Hence, open loop safety protocols
are designed to reliably pass the control back to the medical staff. We call this approach
Integrated Human Machine (IHM) Open-Loop Safety (see Section 3.2).
3.1 Automated Open-Loop Safety
As shown in Figure 3, the automated open-loop safe MD PnP system consists of the following
components:
Automated Open-loop safe supervisor: This supervisory logic is added to the application
layer and runs on top of the MD PnP platform. The commands received from the MD PnP
supervisor go through the open-loop safe supervisor before being sent to the medical devices. The
commands are decomposed into a sequence of timed actions, which ensure that the devices move
to a safe state by taking these actions when the supervisory loop is open. At any point during
the communication of these messages, the supervisory loop can become open due to network
failure or crash of the MD PnP platform. Note that this will not causes any safety hazards
since no commands will be sent unless the corresponding timed safety command has been sent


































Figure 4. IHM Open-Loop Safe MD PnP System Overview
Highly reliable medical device adapters: This component ensures the timed safety com-
mands5 are executed by the device when the MD PnP supervisory loop is open. It is assumed
that the MD PnP device adapter is highly reliable; otherwise, automated open-loop safety cannot
be guaranteed.
3.2 IHM Open-Loop Safety
As shown in Figure 4, the automated open-loop safe MD PnP system consists of the following
components:
Medical Failover Manager (MFM): This component must be highly reliable. It shall be
a simple and verifiably reliable storage and display device that stores and displays the commands
sent by the MD PnP supervisor. Similar to avionic systems, the capability of having a record of
what the system has been doing will have great safety and legal values. In addition, the MFM
has a configurable watchdog timer that will issue an alarm, should the MD PnP supervisor stop
sending heartbeats to the MFM. Once the alarm is sounded, medical staff can check the MFM
and know what the most recent command is, which may or may not be executed, and the recent
history. This allows medical staff to take safety actions in an informed way. The MFM component
consists of 1) a highly reliable storage and display device, 2) a watch dog timer and alarm, 3) an
interface with the MD PnP system. If the supervisor fails to deliver heart beats to the timer, an
alarm will sound indicating that the MD PnP supervisory loop is open.
Integrated Human Machine (IHM) open-loop safety supervisor: In addition to the
highly reliable MFM , the near term solution includes a supervisory component, which is respon-
sible for executing the open-loop safety protocol steps. In this approach, we use timed alarms to
ask medical staff to move the system into a safe state, since we assume device adapters are not
highly reliable and therefore cannot be trusted to move the medical devices to safe states. The
protocol includes the following steps:
 At each step, the IHM open-loop safety supervisor first sends the command (received from
5A timed safety command is a command to execute a safety action at the expiration of a timer set by the



































(b) IHM Open-Loop Safety
Figure 5. Subtrees for Supervisory Loop Crash
the MD PnP supervisor) to the MFM and waits for an acknowledgment before sending
the command to the medical device. This way, when the MD PnP system crashes and
the alarm sounds by MFM, medical staff know the command history and the most re-
cent command that the supervisor attempted to execute, greatly facilitating the medical
staff’s take over task. For commands that will put the device into a transient safe state,
the command should be annotated with the open loop safe action that a staff should per-
form manually. For example, the ”pause” command sent to the MFM is annotated as
pause at time t, (to be followed by ”resume” command at t + 30sec).
 After receiving an acknowledgment from the MFM, the IHM open-loop safety supervisor
sends the command to the medical device and waits for an acknowledge from the device. If
an acknowledgment is not received in time, an alarm will sound to let medical staff know
that the device is not responding.
Figure 5(a) shows the sub-tree for automated open-loop supervisory loop crash and Figure 5(b)
shows the sub-tree for IHM open-loop supervisory loop crash.
We recommend the record keeping in general. An accurate record of what the MD PnP super-
visor has done will be invaluable for post operation analysis, especially settling disputes, if any.
To this end, MFM’s record system should be protected from tampering by unauthorized users.
In the next section, we illustrate how to use each open-loop safety approach to ensure that no
MD PnP component is a causal factor of known safety hazards in the context of several clinical
scenarios.
4 MD PnP Clinical Scenarios
In this section, we study six clinical scenarios and demonstrate the process of safety analysis of
the MD PnP system using extended fault trees in each case. For more details on these scenarios
refer to [11], [12] and [13]. We assume for each scenario, the clinical application specifies what
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kind of response it expects form each medical device. In other words, the device composition must
be definitive for each application.
4.1 Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy
“A 32-year-old woman had a laparoscopic cholecystectomy (gall bladder removal) performed
under general anesthesia. At the surgeon’s request, a plain film x-ray was shot during a cholan-
giogram [bile duct x-ray]. The anesthesiologist stopped the ventilator for the film. The x-ray
technician was unable to remove the film because of its position beneath the table. The anesthe-
siologist attempted to help her, but found it difficult because the gears on the table had jammed.
Finally, the x-ray was removed, and the surgical procedure resumed. At some point, the anesthe-
siologist glanced at the EKG and noticed severe bradycardia. He realized he had never restarted
the ventilator. The ventilator is typically stopped for 20 to 60 seconds to prevent motion-induced
blurring of the image. This patient ultimately expired.” [14].
There are two approaches to prevent the motion-induced blur in the x-ray. If we use the MD
PnP system to pause the ventilator, then the MD PnP system becomes safety critical and we will
illustrate how to ensure open-loop safety. An alternative, in which the MD PnP system does not
need to be safety critical [5], is suggested.
The supervisor uses information from the ventilator to decide when to trigger the x-ray. The
synchronization algorithm defines exactly how this decision is made according to respiratory cycle
as a function of pressure over time. The pressure increases until the end of inspiration (at time
T after start of breath), at which point it drops off quickly through expiration. There is usually
a pause between the end of exhalation and the start of the next breath. For this case study, we
want to support taking an x-ray when the lung was not moving significantly. This occurs when
the patient is relatively still at the peak of inspiration or between the end of expiration and the
start of the next breath. An exposure is possible if the time the patient is still exceeds the time
needed for the exposure plus the latency between triggering the x-ray and the actual exposure.
Under this approach, the MD PnP system is not safety critical because it does not send stop
commands to the ventilator, which is a safety-critical device. We recommend this approach
whenever it is applicable. However, should pausing the ventilator be needed and users want to
use the the MD PnP system to manage the pause directly, then the MD PnP system becomes
safety critical. Since the MD PnP supervisor sends commands directly to the safety critical
ventilator, this case shall be subject to the 4-step safety analysis process. The first step is to
determine the safety hazard(s) in this scenario and perform the fault tree analysis (S1).
Following the modular approach, we first present the subtree for the MD PnP therapeutic
configuration, subtree 3.1, in Figure 6(a). Next, we use this subtree to represent the series of fault
events and states regarding the main elements of the MD PnP system, which can contribute to
brain damage in Figure 6(b).
In theory, the supervisor can send an atomic command pause and then resume at time t,
which will be safe if the approved ventilator can execute atomic transactions. This is the preferred
method. However, currently ventilators can only execute simple commands such as “turn on” and
“turn off”. Hence, users may use pause command followed by a resume command later at time
t. In this case, crash of the MD PnP platform or the network opens up a path to the root of



























(b) Extended Fault Tree for Brain Damage
Figure 6. Extended Fault Tree Analysis of Brain Damage in the MD PnP System
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[1] (Ventilator , Off, (On, 30s)) 
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[3] (Set Device Timer, 30) 
[4] Ack 
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1OLS  stands  for  Open-­‐Loop  Safety
1
Figure 7. Sequence Diagram for Automated Open-Loop Safe for Safe Ventilator Configuration
is responsible for coordinating the x-ray and ventilator devices can lead to an unsafe ventilator
configuration; this should be mitigated. The dotted red lines on the extended fault tree indicates
these paths (step S2).
To break such paths to the root and ensure system safety despite the failure of these components,
an open-loop safe approach is needed (step S3). Next, we present the automated and IHM

























































(b) Extended Fault Tree for Brain Damage
Figure 8. Brain Damage Extended Fault Tree for Automated Open-Loop Safe MD PnP System
4.1.1 Automated Open-loop Safe Coordination of X-ray and Ventilator
In this section we present the automated open-loop safe approach to prevent crash of the MD
PnP supervisory loop to cause brain damage in the laparoscopic cholecystectomy scenario (step
S3). When the MD PnP supervisor intends to send a command to turn off the ventilator for a
period of time, a sequence of timed actions are sequentially sent by the open-loop safe supervisor.
In this case, a command to resume the ventilator at time t is sent before sending the command
to turn off the ventilator. The open loop safe protocol ensures that the timed safety command
is received by the device before sending the ”turn off” command. The ”turn off” command puts
the ventilator in a transient safe state, because if the ventilator remains off for too long, patient’s
blood oxygen level can drop below the safe threshold and brain damage may happen.
The commands for timed actions are sent over the network and received by the open-loop
safety device adapter, since existing ventilators do not support timer based actions. When the
”resume ventilator at time t” command is sent to the MD PnP device adapter, if the ventilator
has timer capability then the device adapter, which must be highly reliable, sets the device timer;
otherwise, a timer is created and set by the adapter, which triggers the automatic resumption of
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ventilator upon expiration. After setting the timer (through either of the two approaches), an
acknowledgment is sent to the open-loop safe supervisor. At this point, when it is assured that
a timer to resume the ventilator is set, the command to turn off the ventilation is sent. Figure 7
shows the sequence of messages exchanged among the different components of the open-loop safe
MD PnP system. The timer value in this example is only a nominal value; in general, the timer
value for different actions can be updated as more recent information on patient state and status
of medical devices become available.
At any point during the communication of these messages, the supervisory loop can become
open due to network failure or crash of the MD PnP platform. This will not causes a hazard
since the command to turn off the ventilator will not be sent unless the resume timer has been
set successfully. This protocol is any-step safe. If the ventilator device does not have a timer
feature, the open-loop safe protocol depends on the MD PnP device adapter to set up the timer
and perform the timed safety action. In this case it is assumed that the MD PnP device adapters
are highly reliable and meet the safety-critical requirements; otherwise, open-loop safety cannot be
guaranteed. We recognize that such highly reliable adapters will not be available in the near term,
hence an alternative ”medical staff in the loop” safety solution is provided in the next section.
For the last step of our safety analysis procedure, we redraw the extended fault tree that can lead
to brain damage. Figure 8(b) shows the updated fault tree, which includes the unsafe therapeutic
configuration subtree for automated open-loop safe system, Subtree 3.2. This subtree, shown in
Figure 8(a), indicates that the automated open loop safe supervisor may fail. However, the open
loop safe protocol is any-step safe by definition; the open-loop safe supervisor always ensures that
the MD PnP device has received the timed safety action before moving to a transient safe state.
Moreover, the device adapter is highly reliable. Therefore, if the supervisory loop becomes open
the adapter will move the device into a safe state. Assuming the initial configuration is safe,
failure of supervisory loop at any step of the handshaking protocol will not result in an unsafe
configuration. The safe ventilator operation is added as depicted by AND gate in Figure 8(b)),
which results in removal of all paths to the root.
4.1.2 IHM Open-loop Safe Coordination of X-ray and Ventilator
Timed safety commands executed by highly reliable medical device adapters to enable automated
open loop safety protocols is a preferred long term solution. However, highly reliable adapters may
not be on the market in the near future. A simple near term solution is to include a MFM in the
MD PnP system. Instead of depending on device adapters to move the system into an open-loop
safe state, we only require one highly reliable component, the MFM to remind medical staff to
move the system into an open loop safe state. With a highly reliable MFM, all the medical
device adapters are only required to be reliable. The MD PnP supervisor should follow the IHM
protocol for sending commands to the ventilator. The communication between ventilator and MD
PnP supervisor in the laparoscopic cholecystectomy scenario includes the following steps:
 The MD PnP supervisor sends pause and then resume at time t command to the MFM and
waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm sounded by the supervisor.
 If an acknowledgment is received, the MD PnP supervisor then sends pause ventilator to
the device and waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm is sounded by
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the supervisor.
 Before pause time reaches limit, the MD PnP supervisor may send resume ventilator com-
mand to the MFM and waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm is
sounded by the supervisor.
 If an acknowledgment is received, the MD PnP supervisor sends resume ventilator com-
mand to the device and waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm is
sounded by the supervisor.
 If the MFM stops receiving heartbeats from the MD PnP supervisor, an alarm sounds
to warn medical staff that the MD PnP supervisory loop has failed. The last command
that supervisor attempts to execute and recent command history are displayed. To further
facilitate the failure handling by medical staff, whenever the supervisor issues a command
that puts the patient in a transient safe state, it should annotate the command with a timed
safety action. For example, annotate the pause ventilator command with the note: pause
at time t, to be resumed by (t + 30sec)
Figures 9(a) and 9(b) show the sequence of messages exchanged among the different components
of the automated open-loop safe MD PnP system in the normal and crash operation modes,
receptively.
At the last step of our safety analysis procedure, we redraw the extended fault tree for brain
damage. First we present the necessary subtrees to re-draw the brain damage fault tree for IHM
open-loop safe MD PnP system. Figure 10(a) shows the MD PnP therapeutic configuration
subtree when only reliable device adapters are assumed, Subtree 4.1. The subtree for unsafe
device configuration in the IHM open-loop safe MD PnP system, Subtree 4.2, is shown in Figure
10(b). Having these two, we present the brain damage fault tree for the IHM open-loop safe MD
PnP system in Figure 11. The highly reliable MFM in Subtree 4.2 and the AND gate on top
of MD PnP and IHM open-loop safe subbranches (depicted by dashed blue rectangles in Figure
11) results in removal of all paths to the root.
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(b) Open-Loop Safe Operation
Figure 9. IHM Open-Loop Safe Sequence Diagram for Ventilator Configuration
4.2 Airway Laser Surgery
In this section we look at a slightly more complicated scenario of airway laser surgery. The
airway-laser operation is performed on the patient’s airway using a surgical laser when the patient






















































(b) IHM Open-Loop Safe Subtree




























Figure 11. Brain Damage Extended Fault Tree for IHM Open-Loop Safe MD PnP System
concentration of oxygen. Before the surgical phase starts, 100% FiO2 supplied by a ventilator is
recommended so that the surgery phase could be 1 to 5 minutes6. To prevent surgical fire, oxygen
flow must be first blocked before the laser is in use. If the oxygen flow is blocked for too long, the
patient’s blood-oxygen saturation can drop below the safe threshold and brain damage can occur.
To prevent surgical fire or brain damage hazards, the MD PnP supervisor should synchronize
the laser and O2 supply to ventilator. This process is performed through a series of commu-
nications between the supervisor and the medical devices. We use extended fault tree analysis
to demonstrate the behavior of the MD PnP supervisory system and determine whether there
is a chain of events leading to a hazardous situation. The fault tree analysis for brain damage
is the same as the previous clinical scenario; therefore, we focus on surgical fire hazard. This
involves interaction of two medical devices: surgical laser and ventilator. Figure 12 shows the
extended fault tree for surgical fire. Similar to brain damage, failure of the MD PnP components
or communication network can lead to surgical fire. The failure of the MD PnP supervisory loop
prevents the correct commands received by the ventilator and surgical laser devices on time. The
dotted red line shows an example of a path from an MD PnP component to the root of tree.
4.2.1 Automated Open-Loop Safe Approach for Airway Laser Surgical Scenario
In the airway laser surgical scenario, the MD PnP supervisor coordinates the airway laser and
ventilator (oxygen supply) devices to prevent brain damage or surgical fire. However, as can be
seen in the fault trees when there is a network or MD PnP supervisor failure and the supervisory




















Figure 12. Extended Fault Tree for Surgical Fire
To prevent safety hazards when the supervisory loop becomes open, it is recommended to
augment the MD PnP system with an open-loop safety protocol. One simple version is presented
in the previous section for the laparoscopic cholecystectomy scenario. The same protocol can be
used here; however, in this case there are two devices whose actions must be coordinated by the
MD PnP supervisor. The open-loop safe supervisor ensures safety by sequentially sending timed
action commands to the devices.
Figure 13 shows the sequence of communications among open-loop safety components, the MD
PnP components and medical devices.
At the last step of our safety analysis procedure, we redraw the extended fault tree for surgical
fire (Figure 14). The therapeutic configuration subtree for automated open-loop safe system,
Subtree 3.2, is used to re-draw the fault tree. As presented on Subtree 3.2 in Figure 8(a), the
automated open loop safe supervisor may fail. However, the open loop safe protocol is any-step
safe by definition; the open-loop safe supervisor always ensures that the MD PnP device has
received the timed safety action before moving to a transient safe state. Moreover, the device
adapters are assumed to be highly reliable . Therefore, if the supervisory loop becomes open the
adapter will move the device into a safe state. In conclusion, assuming the initial configuration
is safe, failure of the supervisory loop at any step of the handshaking protocol will not result in
an unsafe ventilator configuration. Finally, the addition of the AND gate on top of MD PnP and
open-loop safe subbranches (depicted by dashed blue rectangles in Figure 14) results in removal
of all paths to the root.
4.2.2 IHM Open-Loop Safe Approach for Airway Laser Surgical Scenario
As explained in the previous clinical example, timed safety commands executed by highly reliable
medical device adapters to enable automated open loop safety protocols is a preferred long term
solution. However, a simple near term solution is to have a highly reliable MFM . The MD
PnP supervisor should follow the IHM protocol for sending commands to the ventilator and laser
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Figure 14. Automated Open-Loop Safe MD PnP System Fault Tree Analysis for Surgical Fire Event
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devices. The communication between the MD PnP supervisor and the medical devices in airway
laser surgical scenario includes the following steps:
 The MD PnP supervisor sends a pause command annotated with ”to be resumed at time t”
to the MFM and waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm is sounded
by the supervisor.
 If an acknowledgment is received, the MD PnP supervisor then sends pause ventilator
command and waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm is sounded by
the supervisor.
 After waiting for T seconds to ensure that the oxygen in patient’s airway is cleared, the MD
PnP supervisor sends turn on laser command to the MFM and waits for an acknowledgment;
if one is not received, an alarm is sounded by the supervisor.
 If an acknowledgment is received, the MD PnP supervisor sends turn on laser command to
the device and waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm is sounded by
the supervisor to let medical staff know that the laser is not responding.
 When pause time limit reaches, the MD PnP supervisor sends turn off laser command first
to the MFM and then to the laser after an acknowledgment is received from the MFM. Next,
the supervisor waits for an acknowledgment; if one is not received, an alarm is sounded by
the supervisor.
 If an acknowledgment from laser is received, the MD PnP supervisor sends resume ventilator
command first to the MFM, and then to the ventilator after an acknowledgment is received
from the MFM. Next, the supervisor waits for an acknowledgment from the ventilator; if
one is not received, an alarm is sounded by the supervisor to let medical staff know that the
ventilator is not responding.
 During the operation, whenever the MFM stops receiving heartbeats from the MD PnP
supervisor, an alarm is sounded by the MFM to indicate that the MD PnP supervisory loop
is open. In addition, the list of recent commands is displayed.
Figures 15(a) and 15(b) show the sequence of messages exchanged among the different com-
ponents of the IHM open-loop safe MD PnP system in the normal and crash operation modes,
receptively.
At the last step of our safety analysis procedure, we redraw the extended fault tree for surgical
fire (step S4). Figure 10(a) shows the MD PnP therapeutic configuration subtree when device
adapters are only assumed to be reliable (Subtree 4.1). The subtree for unsafe device configura-
tion in the IHM open-loop safe MD PnP system (Subtree 4.2) is shown in Figure 10(b). Figure 16
shows the updated surgical fire tree that includes these subtrees. The addition of highly reliable
MFM in Subtree 4.2 and the AND gate on top of MD PnP and IHM open-loop safe subbranches
(depicted by dashed blue rectangles in Figure 16) results in removal of all paths to the root.
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Figure 16. IHM Open-Loop Safe MD PnP System Fault Tree Analysis for Surgical Fire Event
4.3 Patient Controlled Analgesia
The main adverse event in the patient controlled analgesia case is morphine overdose. This
safety hazard is shown under Unsafe Therapeutic Configuration → Unsafe Medication Adminis-
tration → Incorrect Bolus Dosage in Figure 25. The extended fault trees in this section show how
this sub branch is populated in the PCA case study.
The MD PnP system in this case includes a smart alarm application and a close loop control
for PCA pump. Failure of the smart alarm application to detect respiratory distress (Figure 17)
or failure of closed loop control to stop the pump on time (Figure 18) will lead to overdose. An
open loop safe solution is required to prevent these hazards when the supervisory loop is open.
A simple version can be setting a timer to stop the PCA pump when the supervisor or network
crashes, before sending the command to start the PCA pump. The timer value can be updated as
the new physiological data on patient state becomes available. The idea is similar to the previous

























































Figure 18. Extended Fault Tree Analysis of Morphine Overdose as a Result of Unsafe Therapeutic
Configuration
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an action to ensure the PCA is moved to a safe state when the MD PnP supervisor crashes or
the network becomes unavailable. This approach will break the paths, shown in Figures 17 and
18(a), to the root.
Figure 18(b) presents the case, in which the MD PnP closed-loop control application fails
before receiving an acknowledgment from the PCA device. To break this path to the root we
recommend the use of MFM that records the intent to deliver a dosage before actually sending
the corresponding command to the PCA device. If this action is not taken and the MD PnP system
crashes after delivering a dosage and before receiving the acknowledgment from the device, there
would be no record of the dosage administration, which will potentially lead to an overdose.
Making a record of intention to deliver a dosage can break this path to the root. In this case, even
if the MD PnP supervisor crashes after sending the command to the PCA and before receiving
an acknowledgment from the device, the intention to deliver a dosage is already recorded by the
MFM.Therefore, when the MD PnP supervisor restarts it can access this recorded information
and avoid sending the commend to deliver another dosage.
Note that fault trees include Subtree 4.1 representing unsafe therapeutic configuration, and
Subtree 1 representing unsafe monitoring configuration in the MD PnP system. We presented
Subtree 4.1 when discussing brain damage and fire fault trees in the first two clinical examples;
Subtree1 is introduced later in the report when studying the MD PnP derived alarms.
4.4 Prepare Intensive Care Unit to Receive Post-OP Cardiac Patient
The MD PnP supervisor reads the settings and status of medical devices used in the operating
room, when preparing an intensive care unit (ICU) for receiving post-op patients. This information
includes the medication and infusion rate for all IV pumps, the setting of mechanical ventilation,
the number of invasive pressure channels being monitored, etc. A simple handshaking process
is recommended to ensure that complete list of devices and corresponding setting is received by
the MD PnP supervisor in the intensive care unit. In the next step, all ICU medical devices
are preset to OR settings by the MD PnP supervisory application. The clinician confirms all
automatic device settings and enters the clinical data that cannot be retrieved automatically.
The MD PnP middleware must have a communication component to handle remotely accessing
medical devices connected to clinical network. Devices such as ventilator have different modes of
operation and settings. The translation and mapping of setting from one device to another are
performed by the interoperability component of the MD PnP middleware and must be verified as
clinically correct.
We assume all medical devices use the same interface description language. The MD PnP
middleware can then provide a uniform format to clinical application designers for interacting
with medical devices. The middleware translates the uniform format to a specific device setting
format. Therefore, the complexity of heterogeneous devices will be hidden from the applications
and encapsulated by the MD PnP middleware. As explained above, we assume that the correctness
of the MD PnP interoperability logic is verified. Figure 19 shows the overall architecture of the
MD PnP framework for the clinical scenario involving preparation of ICU to receive post operation
patients. The device configuration setting must be verified by human before being applied to the
devices in ICU and therefore no device is directly manipulated by the MD PnP components.


















































Figure 19. The MD PnP System for Preparing ICU to Receive Post-OP Cardiac Patient
this clinical scenario.
4.5 Home to Hospital
The data coming from telehealth (TH) monitoring devices, used at home, may be unreliable or
inaccurate. Inaccurate physiological measurements from these devices may be used in addition
to more accurate data from hospital devices to monitor patient state. However, this may result
in unintentional inaccuracy in patient state assessment. Properly managing the heterogeneity of
medical sensors’ reliability can alleviate this problem. One approach is exporting the information
regarding the reliability of different medical sensors to the application layer. Considering the
accuracy of different medical sensor readings when making decisions about patient state can
increase the safety and effectiveness of the patient monitoring process.
The MD PnP interoperability program recommends a unified model for medical sensors and
physiological measurements, which is defined as an abstraction of device and measurement infor-
mation relevant to the safety and effectiveness of patient care, including the accuracy of measure-
ments. One such model is shown in Table 4. Most of the chosen attributes for our measurement
model are self-describing. Some sensor devices generate more than one physiological measurement
with different accuracies. Therefore, accuracy information must be included for each pair of device
and physiological measurement. We show examples of the measurement model instantiation; the
values stored in the model instants are only nominal values. The fields can be populated as the
information becomes available.
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Physiology Monitor Type Device ID Patient ID Accuracy Current Reading
Blood Pressure Blood Pressure Cuff BP-ICU211 1236780 90% 80 mmHg
SpO2 Oximeter BP-Cuff-ICU211 1236780 97% 95%
Pulse Rate Oximeter Oximeter-ICU211 1234568 95% 100 bpm
Heart Rate EKG-TH EKG-1232211 1232211 95% 95 bpm
Heart Rhythm EKG EKG-ICU211 1236780 98% Sinus
ScvO2 Central Venous Catheter CVC-ICU211 1236780 99% 80%
CVP Central Venous Catheter CVC-ICU211 1236780 99% 80 mmHg
Table 4. Unified Device and Measurement Models
4.6 IV Sedation for a GI Procedure
The MD PnP framework aims at improving the safety and effectiveness of patient care by
integrating multiple devices for additional intelligence. For this clinical scenario, there are four
major components involved in creating a safer clinical environment with inter-operable medical
devices. We look at each component and analyze whether they can contribute to any of the known
potential safety hazards.
4.6.1 Virtual display
The goal here is to have one integrated main display, which receives the clinical data from different
monitoring devices. For this scenario, SpO2, ETCO2 (end-tidal CO2), readings from a depth of
anesthesia monitor, respiratory rate and blood pressure can be displayed remotely on a central
monitor. However, the crash failure detection is simple and straightforward for a display. If the
virtual display crashes remote monitoring would not be possible; however, the clinical data are
still displayed on individual monitoring devices. Therefore, as long as it is verified that the virtual
display will not alter any value it receives from monitoring devices, this component will not cause
any safety hazards.
4.6.2 Derived alarms
The main safety hazards for an MD PnP derived alarm system are 1) false negative alarms 2) false
positive alarms and 3) overlooked true positive alarms, which are the final result of false positive
alarms. Figures 20(a), 20(b), and 21 show the extended fault trees for alarm hazards. We name
these three Subtree 1.1, Subtree 1.2, and Subtree 1.3, respectively. Using these subtrees, we draw
the extended fault tree for unsafe monitoring configuration in the MD PnP system (Figure 22).
To prevent failure of the MD PnP components from contributing to alarm safety hazards, some
precaution must be taken. The generic solution is to use MFM and take the IHM based approach,
in which:
 The MD PnP supervisor queries each device periodically.
 If a device fails to respond for n consecutive cycles, the supervisor sounds an alarm to notify
medical staff that device X has failed to communicate





























































































Figure 22. Unsafe Monitoring Configuration Subtree for MD PnP Derived Alarms
 If the MFM fails to receive heartbeat from the MD PnP supervisor, then MFM sounds
a local alarm indicating that the supervisor has failed to respond and displays the recent
commands.
 Medical staff must enable all the local alarms in individual devices and restart the MD PnP
supervisor and go through all the safety checks.
4.6.3 Virtual front panel/ remote configuration
The extended fault tree for this component is shown in Figure 23. The root of this tree is
unsafe device configuration, which is remotely generated by this MD PnP component. This may
include incorrect setting of therapeutic devices such as ventilator, unsafe IV medication dosage,
or incorrect cutoff threshold values for monitoring devices. Therefore, it is critical to detect crash
of the MD PnP supervisory loop, using methods such as IHM protocol along with MFM. When
crash of MD PnP components is detected by MFM, a local alarm must be sounded to get the
attention of medical staff. The alarm would indicate that the remote front panel has crashed and






















Figure 23. Extended Fault Tree Analysis for the MD PnP Virtual Front Panel
4.6.4 Autonomous control
The autonomous control component is responsible for implementing safety interlocks and physi-
ological closed loop controls. Verifying the logical correctness of this component is critical. The
safety interlock can prevent unsafe interaction between devices and treatment actions. One ex-
ample is the safety interlock between an oxygen controller and surgical laser in the airway laser
surgical scenario. Absence of such interlocks can directly endanger patient safety. In the case of
closed loop control, settings of therapeutic devices and IV medication are automatically controlled
based on the current readings from medical sensors. Therefore, incorrect control values can lead
to unsafe therapeutic configuration.
The execution of safety interlock and closed loop control steps can be interrupted when MD PnP
platform crashes and as shown in Figure 24 may lead to unsafe device operation. The near term
generic solution is to use the IHM open loop safety approach. Each step of the interlock protocol
must have a timed acknowledgment or an alarm will be raised by the MD PnP supervisor, which
is in turn monitored by the highly reliable MFM . However, it shall be user’s responsibility
to verify the interlock protocol together with IHM open loop safety approach, because currently
there is no known general proof that the generic open-loop safety protocol will be compatible with

























Figure 24. Extended Fault Tree Analysis for the MD PnP Autonomous Control Systems
5 A Generic Approach for Safety Analysis of the MD PnP Systems
In this section we look at the steps of a safety analysis procedure for the generic MD PnP system.
We have looked at examples of potential safety hazards in clinical environments caused by incorrect
and unsafe medical device configuration. Figure 25 presents a general categorization of such
potential safety hazards. We consider three main sources of safety hazards: 1) unsafe monitoring
configuration, 2) unsafe therapeutic configuration, and 3) unsafe interaction between monitoring
and therapeutic configurations. We have populated a subset of branches to demonstrate the
general hierarchy. The brain damage hazard explained in the previous section is an example of
a hazard caused by an unsafe therapeutic configuration, specifically incorrect ventilator device
setting. An example of interaction hazard is the surgical fire hazard that is caused by unsafe
interaction of two therapeutic devices: ventilator and surgical laser.
Step1: For each clinical scenario, enumerate the potential safety hazards and study the unsafe
configuration causing each hazard. As described in the previous section, use the extended fault
tree to demonstrate the system behavior leading to hazardous situations. Figure 26 shows a
generic extended fault tree for the MD PnP system with reliable device adapters. The tree
includes Subtree 4.1, which was presented in Figure 10(a).
Step 2: Determine if there is a causal chain from the MD PnP components in the system to any
unsafe configuration causing the safety hazard. The root of this tree, indicated by Unsafe Device
Configuration, encompasses different safety hazards caused by unsafe device configuration. For






































Figure 25. A Generic Categorization of Potential Safety Hazards
substitutes for this term in the generic tree. As presented in the example scenarios, there are
potential paths from the MD PnP components to unsafe configuration which ultimately results
in a safety hazard. Note that this is true for clinical scenarios, in which the medical devices are
directly manipulated by the MD PnP components. For example, in airway laser surgical scenario
the MD PnP supervisor controls and coordinates the actions to turn on, turn off and change
the settings of ventilator (oxygen supply) and surgical laser. Therefore, failure of any MD PnP
component potentially leads to an unsafe device configuration and ultimately surgical fire or brain
damage.
For clinical cases in which the medical devices are directly manipulated by the MD PnP com-
ponents, we use an open-loop safe approach to prevent the failure of the MD PnP components
from contributing to potential safety hazards. We discussed two different approaches: Automated



















Figure 26. Extended Fault Tree Analysis of the MD PnP System with Reliable Device Adapters
Step 3 & 4 for Automated Open-Loop Safe Approach: Recommend an automated open-
loop safe solution and redraw the extended fault tree for each safety hazard. In the automated
protocol, we require highly reliable device adapters. A set of commands, including timed safety
actions, are sequentially sent to medical devices. At each step, we wait for an acknowledgment
from the device before sending the subsequent commands. When sending a command to move
a device into a state, which is only temporarily safe, first a safety timed action is sent to the
device. This action will be taken by the device if the MD PnP supervisory loop becomes open,
and will move the device to a safe state after the specified time elapses. For example, in the
laparoscopic cholecystectomy scenario, a timed safety action, indicating that the ventilator must
be resumed after a specific time period, is sent to the ventilator. When the device acknowledges
that the timer to resume the ventilator is set up, the MD PnP supervisor sends the command to
turn off the ventilator. Note that moving the ventilator to the off state is only temporarily safe;
therefore, the open loop safe protocol takes the safety precautions before sending the corresponding
command. Refer to Figures 7 and 13 for of message sequence communicated between different
components of the automated open-loop safe MD PnP system. This approach ensures that the
failure of the supervisory loop at any step during the communication will not leave the system in
an unsafe configuration, given the initial device configuration is safe. The main components of
the automated open-loop safe MD PnP system is shown in Figure 3.
At the last step of safety analysis procedure, we redraw the extended fault tree for each safety
hazard. The therapeutic configuration subtree for automated open-loop safe system, Subtree 3.2,
was presented in Figure 8(a). Figures 27(a), 27(b), and 27(c) show the extended fault trees for
alarm hazards. We name these three Subtree 2.1, Subtree 2.2, and Subtree 2.3, respectively.
Using these subtrees, we draw Subtree 2 for unsafe monitoring configuration in the automated
open-loop safe MD PnP system (Figure 28). Putting together the monitoring and therapeutic
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subtrees, we have the general extended fault tree fort automated open-loop safe MD PnP system
in Figure 29. As presented in Subtree 3.2 and Subtree 2, the automated open loop safe supervisor
may fail. However, the open loop safe protocol is any-step safe; the open-loop safe supervisor
always ensures that the MD PnP device has received the timed safety action before moving to a
transient safe state. Moreover, the device adapters are assumed to be highly reliable devices.
Therefore, if the supervisory loop becomes open, the adapter will move the device into a safe

































































(c) Overlooked True Positive









































































Figure 29. Extended Fault Tree Analysis of Automated Open-loop Safe MD PnP System
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any step of the handshaking protocol will not result in unsafe ventilator configuration. Finally,
the addition of AND gate on top of MD PnP and open-loop safe subbranches (depicted by dashed
blue rectangles in Figure 29) results in removal of all paths to the root.
Step 3 & 4 for IHM Open-Loop Safe Approach: Recommend an integrated human-
machine open-loop safe solution and redraw the extended fault tree for each safety hazard. The
main components of an IHM-based open-loop safe MD PnP system are shown in figure 4. The
MFM must be highly reliable, and should have its own power supply and a built-in alarm. The
interface between timer and the MD PnP supervisor should be wired; USB port is one example.
The medical device adapters, in this design, only need to be cleared as reliable. Figures 9(a) and
15(a) show the sequence of messages communicated between the different components of IHM
open-loop safe MD PnP system for the first two clinical examples.
At the last step, we redraw the fault tree for each safety hazard considering the IHM open-
loop safety approach in place. The subtrees for MD PnP system with reliable device adapters
(Subtree 4.1) and IHM open-loop safe system (Subtree 4.2) have been presented in Figures 10(a)
and 10(b), respectively. Figure 30 shows the general extended fault tree for the IHM open-loop
safe MD PnP system, drawn using these subtrees. The addition of highly reliable MFM and
the AND gate on top of MD PnP and IHM open-loop safe subbranches (depicted by dashed blue


























Figure 30. Extended Fault Tree Analysis of IHM Open-loop Safe MD PnP System
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6 Summary
As noted on the Medical Device “Plug-and-Play” (MD PnP) program’s website, adoption of
medical device interoperability opens the door to significantly mitigate the preventable medical
errors. The goal of this program is to develop the technological foundation to design the next
generation medical systems. In an MD PnP system, medical devices are plugged in as needed,
information from different sources are fused, and medical actions are coordinated by providing an
integrated clinical environment (ICE).
On the other hand, the MD PnP middleware and applications run on top of commercial comput-
ing and communication platforms. There are no approved platforms by any agency that support
plug and play. This is because plug and play could generate new configurations not considered
during the approval process. Furthermore, all existing commercial platforms include a disclaimer
indicating that these platforms are not designed to be used for safety critical systems and ap-
plications. Therefore, we need to consider its failure modes and the safety impacts on intended
medical applications.
This document provides the guidelines to assist users to safely use the MD PnP system, which
typically consists of a commercial platform not designed for safety critical applications. We have
illustrated how to determine if the planned MD PnP system usage is a causal factor in the known
safety hazards of a medical procedure. We used extended fault tree for safety analysis of MD PnP
systems. The need for safety engineering expertise and domain knowledge is known as a limiting
factor in the use of fault tree analysis. Ensuring comprehensiveness of fault trees is a challenging
task. In complex systems, it is possible to miss some system behavior, which can contribute to
the safety hazards not presented in the analysis but exists in real world systems. Thus, for safety
critical MD PnP system, the extended fault tree analysis should be approved.
Should the MD PnP usage be a causal factor of safety hazards, we provided guidelines to
transform the configuration so that it is no longer a causal factor. We discussed long term and
near term solutions:
 The long solution requires device makers to support simple timed safety actions.
 The near term solutions for existing medical devices is to use a Medical Failover Manager
(MFM ) to remind users to perform the timed safety actions.
When the MD PnP system’s output are used to manipulate safety critical medical devices, we
recommend using MFM and following the IHM handshaking protocol, even when the MD PnP
sends safety critical medical devices commands, which are first reviewed and approved by medical
staff. Keeping an accurate record for what the MD PnP supervisor has done will be invaluable for
post operation analysis, especially settling disputes if any. Hence, MFM’s record system should
be protected from tampering by unauthorized users.
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